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Careful Commitments: Democratic States
and Alliance Design
Daina Chiba, University of Essex
Jesse C. Johnson, University of Kentucky
Brett Ashley Leeds, Rice University
Evidence suggests that leaders of democratic states experience high costs from violating past commitments. We argue
that because democratic leaders foresee the costs of violation, they are careful to design agreements they expect to have
a high probability of fulfilling. This may cause democratic leaders to prefer flexible or limited commitments. We
evaluate our argument by analyzing the design of alliance treaties signed by countries of the world between 1815 and
2003. We find that alliances formed among democratic states are more likely to include obligations for future con-
sultation rather than precommitting leaders to active conflict, and defense pacts formed among democratic states are
more likely to specify limits to the conditions under which member states must join their partners in conflict. This
research suggests that separating screening effects and constraining effects of international agreements is even more
difficult than previously believed. States with the greatest likelihood of being constrained are more carefully screened.
A defining feature of democratic institutions is therelative ease with which citizens can punish leadersfor their decisions. If citizens are unhappy with the
performance of their leader, they can remove him or her
from office through elections or other mechanisms. Recently,
scholars have used this aspect of democratic institutions to
argue that democratic leaders are more likely to fulfill inter-
national commitments (McGillivray and Smith 2008). Citi-
zens concerned with their state’s reputation for fulfilling past
commitments will be less likely to reelect a leader that violates
international commitments, thus providing incentives for dem-
ocratic leaders to honor their international promises. A num-
ber of studies have provided empirical support for the claim
that democratic leaders are less likely to violate international
commitments (e.g., Gaubatz 1996; Kelley 2007; Leeds 2003a;
Morrow 2007).
While the propensity for democratic leaders to fulfill the
commitments they make follows from the claim that demo-
cratic leaders face high domestic costs for violating agree-
ments, we suggest there are other, prior implications worth
considering. If democratic leaders anticipate these high costs
of violation, they should be more careful about the commit-
ments they make. Democratic leaders should only make com-
mitments they expect to have a high probability of fulfilling
(e.g., Leeds 1999).
We examine this argument in the context of military al-
liances. We argue that because democratic leaders face high
costs from violating commitments, they will sometimes design
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alliance agreements that provide them flexibility to choose
their actions at a later date. This allows them to avoid the high
costs associated with alliance violation if they are unwilling to
assist their partner(s) in the event of military conflict. Addi-
tionally, we argue that if democratic leaders do commit them-
selves to the defense of their partner(s), then they may limit
their commitments such that they are required to intervene
only under specific conditions. This limits their commitments
to circumstances in which they feel confident they will be
willing to join a war and minimizes the chance that they will
suffer the costs associated with alliance violation. We test the
argument using a sample of alliances signed between 1815 and
2003. The analysis reveals strong support for our argument
and provides at least a partial answer for an enduring puzzle in
alliance politics—the prevalence of half-hearted commitments.
Our argument also has important general implications for
studying the effects of international agreements on foreign
policy behavior and outcomes. Scholars have previously ques-
tioned whether international agreements can constrain state
behavior—that is, cause states to behave in ways commensurate
with the agreement even when their present interests might
cause them to prefer to violate their past promises—or whether
the main effect of international agreements is to indicate to
others which states have interests in line with the requirements
of an agreement (a screening effect). Our argument and results
suggest that those states that are most likely to be constrained
by agreements screen more carefully; screening is endogenous
to constraint. This suggests that constraintmay bemore difficult
to observe, but it also suggests that agreements should serve as
a more effective signal of future intentions for states believed to
be more effectively constrained by agreements.
DESIGNING ALLIANCES WITH DOMESTIC AUDIENCES
Military alliances are formal agreements signed by leaders of
independent states that commit the leaders to cooperate in the
event of future military conflict. The dominant scholarly view
is that state leaders sign alliances for the benefits of signaling
and commitment. First, the fact that states are willing to bear
the costs of formalizing the commitment provides informa-
tion to adversaries and allies about their interests and prob-
able future behavior. Second, the coordination benefits and
potential reputational costs generated by the agreement may
change the incentives of states, making it more likely that they
will fight together in future conflicts (Fearon 1997; Morrow
1994; Smith 1995, 1998a).
The signaling and commitment generated by formaliz-
ing alliances is intended to deter adversaries. When a state
leader is considering making a demand of another state
backed by the threat of military force, the primary factor
influencing the leader’s decision about whether to make a
demand and what demand to make is the leader’s expec-
tation about his or her state’s ability to prevail should war
occur. Potential targets who receive assistance from outside
powers are, all else equal, more difficult to defeat in conflict.
Thus, to the extent that formal alliances are useful indicators
of whether a potential target will receive assistance in conflict,
states with allies should be less likely to be the targets of
militarized disputes. Formal models and empirical evidence
both suggest this to be the case (Johnson and Leeds 2011;
Leeds 2003b; Morrow 1994; Smith 1995, 1998a).
The deterrent potential of alliances should be related to the
clarity and strength of the commitment made. Unambiguous
promises of active military support increase the likelihood
that members will experience costs for failing to intervene
in a conflict on behalf of an ally. Commitments that are more
costly to break should in turn be more credible to potential
challengers. Thus, strong and clear commitments should deter
a greater range of potential challengers. In addition, commit-
ments that include a broader range of conditions (that is,
are invoked under a wide range of circumstances) have the
potential to deter a larger set of potential challengers than
those alliances that are limited, for instance, to particular
adversaries, locations, or ongoing conflicts. Given the uncer-
tainty that exists about future threats, states should prefer
commitments that are applicable to any future challenge.
This logic, as Fearon (1997) points out, creates a puzzle.
In fact, partial commitments exist. Many alliance agreements
do not require states to precommit to assist one another
militarily but instead obligate the states to consult in the event
of military crisis with the goal of formulating a coordinated
response. These consultation pacts provide a clear indication
to adversaries that the states expect to share at least some
common interests and hope to work together in response
to any crisis, but they stop short of guaranteeing assistance.
The latter fact should not escape notice by adversaries; ad-
versaries should doubt the credibility of the coordination
promise given that the states were unwilling to precommit
themselves to joint action. Yet consultation pacts are com-
mon. According to the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Pro-
visions (ATOP) data set, 32% of the alliances signed between
1815 and 2003 that require military coordination versus an
adversary include only promises to consult and attempt to
coordinate future behavior (Leeds et al. 2002).1
Consider, for instance, the language in the 1912 consul-
tation pact between Great Britain and France (Baltzly and
1. This calculation excludes agreements that include only promises
of nonaggression from the denominator. We allow consultation pacts to
provide for promises of nonaggression, but not for promises of neutrality
or active military support.
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Salomone 1950, 37–38). On one hand, this agreement ex-
plicitly states that the governments have not precommitted
themselves to joint action; the text makes quite clear that
choosing to stay out of a future conflict involving the ally
would not be considered a violation of the agreement. On the
other hand, the agreement also makes it clear that themilitary
staffs have and will continue to make plans for joint action
should it be necessary, and should conflict occur, they will
immediately consider the possibility of fighting together. Thus,
the agreement should cause adversaries to anticipate the pos-
sibility of joint action but should make them less confident
of intervention than a full commitment to act together mili-
tarily would. At the same time, the flexibility this agreement
provides in determining future actions lowers the risks that
a state will experience costs associated with violating a com-
mitment.
It is also common for state leaders to limit their commit-
ments to provide active military assistance to particular circum-
stances, for instance, conflict with a particular adversary or
conflict in a particular location. Forty-five percent of defense
pacts in the ATOP data set specify that the obligations are
invoked only under specified circumstances (Leeds et al.
2002). The United States, for example, limited its active mil-
itary obligations within the Southeast Asian Collective De-
fense Treaty (SEATO) to “communist aggression” (United
Nations 1955, Treaty no. 2819). This provision ensured that
theUnited States would be committing itself only to defend its
partners in cases in which US leaders foresaw very strong
US interests in war participation and would not, for instance,
be obligated to assist Pakistan in a war against India. Such
provisions limit obligations (and the risk of violation) at a cost
to deterrence.
One possibility is that more flexible or limited commit-
ments are favored because state leaders recognize that their
alliance design decisions influence two audiences—the ad-
versary and the ally (Benson 2012; Kim 2011). Many scholars
have suggested that there is a trade-off between deterring an
adversary and emboldening a partner. Strong commitments
that do more to convince a potential adversary that an ally
will assist a target may also give that target the confidence
to take a tough stand, or even to engage in bellicose actions.
Thus, Snyder suggests that states try to manage the trade-off
between what he calls abandonment and entrapment (1984,
1997). Kim (2011) argues that states with sufficient bargaining
power will be able to limit the possibility that they are drawn
into conflicts that they prefer not to fight by their partners’
bellicose behavior through precisely specifying the conditions
under which the alliance treaty is activated. Benson (2012)
argues instead that leaders concerned about entrapment will
bemotivated to form alliances with ambiguous commitments,
leaving themselves sufficient freedom of action to stay out of
conflicts later. By making their commitments “probabilistic,”
leaders may be able to create enough uncertainty to appro-
priately balance deterring an adversary with not emboldening
a partner.2
Yet one might wonder why a state would ever be able to be
entrapped by a partner with differing interests. States have
a choice whether to join a war, and, in fact, an ally’s threat not
to intervene under conditions in which the target should
concede should serve to restrain the target from taking such
tough bargaining stances (Fang, Johnson, and Leeds 2014;
Snyder 1997). The only way an ally can be entrapped is if the
leader cannot credibly abandon the target due to high costs
to alliance violation (Fang et al. 2014). Thus, the risk of en-
trapment is closely related to the costs a state expects from
violating a given alliance commitment.
Where do costs from alliance violation come from? First,
there are costs associated with the value of the alliance. For
instance, the state may value the assistance of the alliance
partner in other conflicts. Perhaps the state faces multiple
potential adversaries, and not joining the target in one conflict
might prevent the target from joining the ally in another
conflict. The statemight also fear that not fulfilling the alliance
will jeopardize other important foreign policy concerns by
damaging relations with the ally; if the state gets trade benefits
or foreign aid or support for other foreign policy priorities in
return for the security promise, breaking the alliance could
have costs in other areas (e.g., Morrow 1991). In these cases,
a strong alliance is important to the state in question, and
limiting the effectiveness of the alliance in order to mitigate
the risk of entrapment may not be a desirable strategy.
Second, however, there are costs to a state’s or a leader’s
reputation. Gibler (2008) and Crescenzi et al. (2012) show
that states that have previously violated alliances are less
likely to be able to form new alliances. A substantial liter-
ature also suggests that some leaders may expect significant
domestic costs from violating a past commitment. Leaders
who expect particularly high costs from violating past com-
mitments may be willing to trade off deterrence effective-
ness to mitigate the risk that they will experience costs of vi-
olation; they may find flexible and/or limited commitments
particularly desirable. Benson’s (2012) and Kim’s (2011) ar-
guments may be especially applicable to states that experi-
2. While Benson’s analysis focuses on differences in the language within
defense and offense pacts, we argue that a classic example of a flexible com-
mitment is the consultation pact. Benson codes 45 of 260 defense pacts as
“probabilistic.” We test our hypotheses using this operationalization of flex-
ible commitments also. The results are presented in the appendix, table A.2,
and provide additional support for our argument.
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ence high audience costs (international and/or domestic) from
violating commitments.
Citizens of states have reason to be concerned about
state reputations for keeping promises and fulfilling threats.
As a result, when leaders jeopardize that reputation, citi-
zens have incentives to remove them in favor of new lead-
ers with greater international credibility. Because removing
leaders in states with democratic institutions entails fewer
costs and risks to citizens, having sullied a state’s reputation
has a greater likelihood of having negative consequences
for a leader’s ability to stay in power in a democratic state
than in a nondemocratic state (McGillivray and Smith 2008).
Scholars have used this logic to argue that democracies are
more likely to make credible threats and to fulfill their in-
ternational commitments (e.g., Fearon 1994; Leeds 1999;
Schultz 1999; Smith 1998b).
The fact that democratic leaders expect to be bound to
their international commitments by the threat of domestic
punishment may in some cases make leaders wary of form-
ing risky international agreements (Leeds 1999). For example,
while there is some evidence that democratic states tend
to be particularly open to conflict mediation (Dixon 1993),
Simmons (2002), and Gent and Shannon (2011) do not find
that democracies are more willing to commit to modes of
conflict resolution that produce binding agreements, for ex-
ample, arbitration and adjudication.3 Similarly, Mitchell and
Hensel (2007) find that jointly democratic dyads are less likely
to reach an agreement to settle contentious issues during
any given round of negotiations, and they attribute this to the
wariness democratic leaders have in making commitments
to agreements that might later fail.
While in some cases democracies may avoid commitment
altogether, in other cases democratic leaders may work to
design agreements that mitigate the risks that they will ex-
perience the domestic costs associated with agreement viola-
tion later. For example, Rosendorff and Milner (2001) argue
that when state leaders have uncertainty about their future
interests, theymay include escape clauses in their international
agreements to allow them to defect without experiencing pun-
ishment. Koremenos (2005) argues that uncertainty about fu-
ture interests can cause leaders to form agreements with short
durations, again allowing themselves a legal way to extricate
themselves from a past commitment. And Hafner-Burton,
Helfer, and Fariss (2011) find that democracies aremore likely
to take advantage of the right to derogation in human rights
treaties. In each of these cases, leaders choose to create
agreements with less depth and obligation, potentially limit-
ing their gains from cooperation, in order to avoid being
locked into an agreement at a future date.
While one strategy for leaders who fear the future costs
of violation might be to increase the flexibility of their com-
mitments under conditions of uncertainty, another strategy
might be to limit the degree of uncertainty regarding the
conditions under which they will be required to act.4 If lead-
ers are specific about the circumstances under which action
is required by an agreement, they limit the probability that
they will be in the position of violating the commitment in
the future by limiting their obligations to circumstances in
which they have high expectations that they will be willing
to act. Thus, under conditions in which democratic states
are confident that they would be willing to fulfill agreements
under some circumstances, they may choose limited com-
mitments, whereas under conditions of greater uncertainty,
they may choose flexible commitments.
The attraction of flexible alliance commitments to a dem-
ocratic leader stems from two competing pressures that will
arise in the future if the agreement is invoked. On one hand,
we have evidence that democratic publics prefer for their
leaders to uphold their international legal commitments (Tomz
2008). Recent experimental evidence suggests that citizens
are much more favorably disposed to military action to sup-
port an ally than a non-ally, and survey respondents explain
their support based on their commitment to fulfilling alliance
promises (Tomz and Weeks 2015). On the other hand, going
back as far as Kant, many scholars have claimed that the
public dislikes war and plays a role in restraining bellicose
leaders in democracies. This suggests that a leader who faces
the responsibility of either supporting a partner in war or
breaking an alliance is in a tough position; either action could
have negative consequences for the leader’s ability to main-
tain power (e.g., Croco 2011). McGillivray and Smith (2008)
explain that even if a democratic public gets a better pay-
off by breaking a past agreement and thus prefers for the
leader not to fulfill the commitment in the present, the pub-
lic also benefits from removing that leader from office once
the leader has hurt the state’s reputation in the hope that a
new leader would be better trusted internationally. Thus,
3. Allee and Huth (2006) find that jointly democratic dyads are more
likely to pursue legal settlement than make bilateral concessions, but they
are not more likely to pursue legal settlement rather than continuing a
stalemate.
4. The uncertainty we are referring to is uncertainty about the state’s
future international interests, not about the preferences of future leaders
of their own state. Some scholars have alternatively argued that demo-
cratic leaders who prefer international cooperation and fear they will lose
power to a domestic opponent with different foreign policy preferences
will be particularly likely to choose strong commitments that their do-
mestic successors will find it harder to break (e.g., Mattes 2012; Moravscik
2000).
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even those publics who prefer to break an alliance rather
than fight might still prefer to replace the leader who violated
the international commitment. Our argument is that leaders
try not to put themselves in such a difficult position by being
especially careful about the commitments they make, per-
haps erring toward the side of caution even at the cost of
limiting deterrence.
We do not expect that most members of the public have
detailed knowledge of the language included in alliance
agreements. Yet at the time a situation arises that might in-
voke an alliance, the language of the alliance (and how ob-
ligations are framed by elites) will become quite salient.
What matters for leader survival is whether domestic polit-
ical opponents can be successful in framing the situation
as one in which the leader has risked the national honor
by putting the state’s reputation at risk and abandoning
an ally in its time of need, and this in turn should be influ-
enced by the actual promises made. Thus, leaders may well
compromise deterrence in order to limit the possibility that
they will be held accountable for violation at a later date.5
Our logic suggests that leaders should be concerned about
making commitments that they will later be called upon to
fulfill. Yet many democratic leaders do not stay in office for
long periods, and given their short time horizons, leaders
might worry less about alliance commitments that might be
invoked at a date further into the future. In democratic sys-
tems, however, treaty formation involves more actors than
just the chief executive. The leader’s legislative coalition must
agree to ratify the treaty. This coalition is made up of ambi-
tious politicians, many of whom may envision themselves
as future leaders. Even if the democratic leader herself may
not be in power when an alliance is invoked, her party and
coalition members hope to be. They may pressure a leader
to make flexible or limited commitments.
Thus, leaders operating in democratic states may expect
domestic costs for failing to fulfill an alliance commitment,
and this in turn may make it more difficult for democratic
leaders to restrain their allies because they have a less cred-
ible threat to abandon an intransigent partner. In order to
avoid violation or entrapment, leaders of democratic states
may sometimes limit the depth and obligations of their alli-
ances by making their commitments flexible and/or limited.
We are not arguing that nondemocratic states never worry
about the costs of breaking alliances. As we state above, there
are international reputational consequences for breaking al-
liances as well. We also do not argue that nondemocratic
leaders have no domestic audience nor that the domestic
audience of nondemocratic leaders is uninterested in a rep-
utation for fulfilling commitments. Instead, we argue that
because leaders in democratic states can be removed from
office at lower cost, they are more likely to face the conse-
quence of losing office as a result of violating an international
commitment (McGillivray and Smith 2008).6 All else equal,
leaders of democratic states will be more willing than their
nondemocratic counterparts to forgo the greater deterrence
offered by a firmer or broader commitment in order to avoid
the potential costs associated with violating a commitment.
Once they have decided to form an alliance, leaders operating
in democratic states may be more likely to choose consulta-
tion pacts over defense pacts and to limit the conditions under
which their defense pacts are applicable.
Studying alliance design presents a research design chal-
lenge, however. We only observe alliance designs that are
acceptable to all members of the alliance. We generally do
not have data for a large number of cases about the designs
individual members or potential members preferred during
negotiation. While our theory concerns the alliance designs
that might be preferred by particular kinds of states, we
can only observe alliance designs that are jointly acceptable
to all state members. A number of factors may affect the
bargaining power of different actors during the design pro-
cess. While we do not model these factors explicitly, we hy-
pothesize that as the proportion of original alliance members
that are democratic increases, the alliance design should
be more likely to reflect the preferences of democratic mem-
bers.7 This is both because the democratic members should
have more bargaining influence as their numbers increase
and because democratic potential members may be less likely
to sign the final alliance if the design is against their pref-
erences, leading to the observation of fewer democracies in
those alliances.
5. Similarly, Snyder and Borghard (2011) argue that state leaders tend
to make threats that are ambiguous enough to allow leaders the future
flexibility to back down without experiencing audience costs.
6. There is variance in the extent to which nondemocratic leaders
experience audience costs, but leaders in democracies experience higher
costs than leaders in nondemocracies on average (e.g., Mattes and Rod-
riguez 2014; Uzonyi, Souva, and Golder 2012; Weeks 2008).
7. An alternative approach would be to argue that final design should
reflect the most conservative member’s preferences, and thus the inclu-
sion of even one democratic state in the alliance should result in a higher
probability of commitments being more flexible and/or specific. Because
there are other dimensions on which bargaining power varies, we are less
confident suggesting that one democracy would always be decisive in de-
sign. As a robustness test, however, we do evaluate the effects of having
any democratic members. We find continued support for hypothesis 1
using this alternative operationalization, but weaker support for hypoth-
esis 2. See tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
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Specifically, our hypotheses are:
H1. Alliances formed by a larger proportion of de-
mocracies are more likely to obligate states to future
consultation rather than active assistance.
H2. Defense pacts formed by a larger proportion of
democracies are more likely to specify limits to the con-
ditions under which defensive obligations are invoked.
In the next section, we describe our research design for
evaluating these hypotheses, and in the following section,
we discuss our empirical results. We follow with a discus-
sion of the implications of our findings for broader questions
about the effects of international agreements on behavior.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to test these hypotheses, we analyze treaty obliga-
tions of all alliance agreements collected by the ATOP project,
with the exception of pure nonaggression pacts (Leeds et al.
2002).8 The data span the time frame from 1815 through 2003
and include 536 alliance agreements.9 Our unit of analysis is
a newly formed alliance.10
We use two dichotomous dependent variables to test
the two hypotheses. Our first dependent variable measures
whether or not an alliance agreement obligates the member
states to future consultation rather than precommitting
them to join their partners in war or remain neutral.11 In
order to be included in the ATOP data set, a consultation
pact must specifically require the member states to consult
in the event of crises that have the potential to involve mil-
itary conflict and attempt to pursue a coordinated response
(Leeds 2005, 10). This variable takes on a value of 1 for an
alliance that only obligates states to future consultation but
not to any form of military assistance, and 0 otherwise. It
is coded as 1 for 171 cases (32%).
Our second dependent variable measures whether or not
a defense pact specifies limits to the conditions under which
defensive obligations are invoked. This variable is defined
only for the subset of alliance agreements that have de-
fensive obligations. Alliances might specify that the de-
fensive obligations are only invoked if a member is attacked
by a specific adversary, or in a specific location, or without
provocation by the ally (see Leeds and Mattes 2007, 192).
The variable takes on a value of 1 for any alliance including
defensive obligations that specifies any limits to the con-
ditions under which defensive obligations are invoked, and
a value of 0 for any alliance including defensive obliga-
tions that does not specify such limits. There are 260 alli-
ance treaties that have defensive obligations, and this var-
iable is coded 1 for 116 cases (45%).
We measure our primary independent variable, the pro-
portion of democracies in the alliance, using information
from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2012)
and the regime type data set published by Cheibub, Gandhi,
and Vreeland (2010). This variable is operationalized as the
proportion of alliance members that are democracies at the
time of alliance formation. We code this variable based on
the original members of the alliance, since only original mem-
bers should influence alliance design. The variable ranges
from 0 (cases with no democratic members at formation) to
1 (cases in which all alliance members are democracies at
the time of alliance formation).
A country is coded as a democracy if it receives a polity2
score of 6 or higher in the year of alliance formation
(Marshall et al. 2012). There are some countries that lack a
polity2 score for the year in which they formed an alliance.
In some cases, this is because the state formed the alliance
less than one year before it became officially independent.
In these cases (e.g., Czech Republic in 1992), we base our
democracy coding on the polity2 score from the follow-
ing year. In other cases, however, the state is not included
8. We exclude agreements that commit the states to nonaggression
and have no obligations for defensive support, offensive support, neutral-
ity, or consultation because they resemble conflict management agree-
ments much more than alliances (Leeds and Mattes 2007; Mattes and
Vonnahme 2010). We use ATOP version 3.0.
9. In a set of additional analyses we examine whether our results are
driven by Cold War politics. We estimate models that drop NATO from
the sample, include a Cold War dummy variable, drop the alliances
formed during the Cold War, include a US dummy variable, and drop
alliances formed with the United States. We find support for both hy-
potheses with all of these different model specifications. See tables A.5
through A.10 in the appendix.
10. In some cases, the obligations of alliances are modified after their
formation. We analyze only the initial design with two exceptions. There are
two alliances that are initially formed as nonaggression pacts but later are
modified to include additional obligations. In these two instances (ATOP IDs
4810 and 4985) we code phase 2 of the alliance as its formation since it would
not be in our sample based on phase 1. The results are not sensitive to
dropping those alliances. See tables A.11 and A.12 in the appendix.
11. As a robustness check, we also analyze a variable in which we
allow consultation pacts to include neutrality obligations and distinguish
these from agreements that require active participation in conflict or
neutrality without consultation obligations. For this version of the vari-
able, 218 cases are coded 1 (41%). We also estimate a model dropping 44
alliances that include neutrality obligations but not defense, offense, or
consultation obligations. This allows us to compare consultation pacts
only to pacts requiring active participation in military conflict. In both
cases, the interpretation of results is similar. See tables A.13 and A.14 in
the appendix.
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in the Polity IV data set at all or is missing for several years
in a row. For cases after 1945 that are not included in Pol-
ity IV, we code a state-year as democratic if the state is
coded as a democracy by Cheibub et al. (2010). For five cases
(all German states during the period of German Confed-
eration), we code regime type based on other secondary
sources. The remaining cases are states that formed an alli-
ance while they were under occupation by another country
(specifically, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and
Norway in 1942). We drop these cases from both the nu-
merator and denominator of our measure since we do not
feel comfortable coding the regime type of the governments
in exile.12
Figure 1 shows the distribution of our key independent
variable, proportion of democracies at the time of alliance
formation, for the two samples analyzed. The panel on the
left shows the distribution of this variable for the sample
used to evaluate hypothesis 1, all alliances formed between
1815 and 2003. Most alliances are formed among non-
democracies (51%). In 26% of the observations, half of the
original alliance members were democracies. Many of these
observations are alliances in which a democracy and a non-
democracy formed a bilateral alliance. The third most popu-
lous category is alliances in which all the member states are
democratic at the time of alliance formation (16%). The panel
on the right shows the distribution for the variable for the
subset of alliances with defense obligations. The modal cate-
gory is again alliances with no democratic members at the
time of formation, followed by the category in which 50% of
the original members are democratic, and then followed by
alliances formed by exclusively democratic members. These
three categories make up approximately 92% of the obser-
vations with defense obligations.
In order to be certain that the relationships we observe
between our primary independent variable and our depen-
dent variables are not spurious relationships driven by an-
other factor related to both alliance design and the propor-
tion of democratic alliance members, we also present models
in which we control for factors that we expect might play a
role in explaining the dependent variable and could be cor-
related with our primary independent variable. Some of these
factors reflect the environment that the member states are
facing at the time they form the alliance, and some reflect
other design decisions.
In our analysis of consultation obligations we include
four control variables. First, we control for the similarity of
interests among the alliance members. When states believe
they have more foreign policy interests in common, they
may expect their future incentives to be more in line as well
and may worry less about making stronger alliance com-
mitments. Similarity of interests should thus be negatively
related to the probability states form a consultation pact
rather than a pact explicitly requiring active assistance. We
measure similarity of interests using the S-score of Signorino
and Ritter (1999) based on networks of alliance commit-
ments, but we create the S-score using ATOP alliance data,
a process that is fully explained in our online appendix. We
calculate the S-score one day before alliance formation to
make sure that the score is not influenced by the formation
of the alliance in question. We then take a weak link ap-
proach, measuring similarity of interests among alliance mem-
bers as the minimum S-score of any pair of original alliance
members. Our results are also robust to a measure that uti-
lizes the mean S-score of pairs of states within an alliance
at the time of formation (see tables A.19 and A.20 in the
appendix).
Second, we control for the number of members within
an alliance. Proponents of international cooperation may
sometimes face a broader-deeper trade-off; increasing mem-
bership in cooperative agreementsmay involve watering down
commitments to the point that they become acceptable to a
larger range of states. Thus, alliances with larger memberships
may be more likely to be limited to consultation. Information
about membership also comes from the ATOP data set.
Third, we control for the level of threat faced by alliance
members. As states feel more threatened, they are more
likely to choose a defense pact rather than a consultation
pact to obtain the benefits of greater deterrence. We mea-
sure the level of threat faced by each member state during
the year the alliance is formed using the formula of Leeds
and Savun (2007), which takes into account both the ca-
pabilities and similarity of interests of states within a given
state’s politically relevant international environment.13 We
again assume the weak link approach and measure the threat
12. The polity2 score is missing for 3.8% of the country-years in our
data set. We describe our democracy coding for the countries missing
polity2 scores in table A.1 of the appendix. If we limit our analysis to cases
in which the polity2 score is available and treat other cases as missing, our
interpretation of results remains unchanged. See tables A.15 and A.16 in
the appendix. Dropping occupied states affects only one alliance in our
data set, ATOP ID 2550. Our results are unchanged if we remove that
alliance from the analysis. See tables A.17 and A.18 in the appendix.
13. There are two differences between our measure and Leeds and
Savun’s (2007). First, in constructing our measure we rely on our S-score
created using the ATOP alliance data, discussed in the appendix. Second,
we only consider State B a possible threat to State A if State B is contig-
uous to State A or a major power. In the Leeds and Savun (2007) measure,
minor powers who were not contiguous were considered possible threats
to major powers since they are part of the major power state’s politically
relevant international environment.
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faced by the alliance as the level of threat faced by the
most threatened original alliance member. Our results, how-
ever, are robust to a measure that captures the mean level of
threat faced by the alliance members (see table A.21 in the
appendix).
Finally, we control for whether the alliance was formed
when at least one state was already involved in war. Alli-
ances formed during wartime are less likely to include solely
consultation obligations, and some scholars have argued that
the propensity for democratic states to win wars may be
associated with their greater propensity to co-ally during war
(Choi 2004). This variable comes from the ATOP data set and
is coded 1 for 69 cases (13%).
We also control for the foreign policy portfolio simi-
larity of the alliance members and the number of original
alliance members in our analysis of whether a defense pact
is invoked only under specific conditions.14 As similarity of
interests increases, we expect defense pacts to be less likely
to be limited to specific conditions since the allies may
have less expectation of disagreements in the future. As the
number of alliance members increases, we expect that it is
more likely that leaders will design commitments limited to
specified circumstances.
In addition, we control for two design features in our
second analysis. We first control for whether the alliance
also includes offensive obligations. Offense pacts are highly
likely to be activated only under specific conditions. While
the ATOP data set codes conditions on separate obligations
separately, it may be that when conditions are specified for
the offensive part of an alliance agreement, conditions may
be more likely on the defensive aspects also. This variable
is coded 1 for 65 of 260 cases (25%), and the data come
from ATOP.
Second, we control for whether the defense pact requires
members to consult in the event of a military crisis. In de-
fense pacts that require consultation, members will have
less need to place limits on the conditions under which the
alliance is invoked because they expect to be able to shape
their allies’ responses to a crisis during the consultation.
Forty-nine percent of the defense pacts in our sample also
include consultation obligations; these data come directly
from the ATOP data set.
Our dependent variables are dichotomous, and thus we
first use simple logit models to estimate our coefficients. Yet
while we are interested in evaluating choices regarding de-
sign among alliances that are formed, we recognize that lead-
ers must first choose to form an alliance at all. If an alliance
is not formed, no design choices are made. This is not a tradi-
tional sample selection problem in that the second stage is
not a missing value if stage one does not occur; it is logi-
cally undefined (Vance and Ritter 2014). Thus, we also em-
ploy a two-part model (2PM), sometimes referred to as a
hurdle model, to consider the impact of the covariates on
Figure 1. Proportion of original alliance members with democratic political systems
14. Unlike our analysis of consultation obligations, we do not control
for the level of threat faced by the members at the time of alliance for-
mation. It is not straightforward to assess the relationship between levels
of threat and the specificity of defense obligations because sometimes the
limits are designed to exclude the source of threat from the casus foederis,
and some are specifically aimed at addressing the major source of threat.
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the probability an alliance is formed at all (Cragg 1971). The
2PM does not require the exclusion restriction common to
Heckman style selection models, and thus it is possible to use
the same set of covariates at both stages.
The 2PM is appropriate for a data generating process
that involves first a choice of whether to form an alliance,
and conditional on that choice, a choice of design features.
But what if a leader simultaneously chooses among form-
ing no alliance, forming a consultation pact, or forming a
defense pact? To capture this possibility, we also conduct a
multinomial logit analysis for each hypothesis with the addi-
tional option of forming no alliance. Due to space concerns,
the tables including these multinomial logit results appear
in the appendix for this article, but they are discussed in
the text of the next section.15 Both the 2PM and multinomial
logit analyses require a sample of cases for which no alliance
formed.16 To generate this sample, we follow the procedure
suggested by Poast (2010); we generate a random sample of
k-adic observations that did not form an alliance and are
stratified according to the distribution of our 536 k-ads
that did form an alliance.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of our empirical analysis are reported in tables 1
and 2. Table 1 reports our evaluation of hypothesis 1. The
dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous vari-
able that codes whether the alliance obligates the members
to consultation rather than active assistance. In column 1
we report the results of a simple logit analysis of a speci-
fication that includes only our primary independent vari-
able, and in column 2 we report the results of logit analysis
15. The multinomial logit model is based on the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. We tested if this assumption is
violated and found no evidence of violation. See tables A.24 and A.25 in
the appendix.
Table 1. Logit and 2PM Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815–2003
Logit 1 Logit 2 2PM 1
Consul
(1)
Consul
(2)
Consul
(3)
Alliance
(4)
Proportion of democracies 1.80*** 1.59*** 1.59*** .10
(.26) (.26) (.27) (.15)
Similarity of interests 21.45** 21.45** .28
(.57) (.60) (.37)
Number of members 2.14* 2.14** .04*
(.07) (.07) (.02)
Threat level 21.41* 21.41** 22.20***
(.73) (.65) (.37)
War time 21.12*** 21.12*** 2.04
(.37) (.40) (.14)
Constant 21.41*** .59 .59 22.07***
(.14) (.62) (.62) (.39)
Observations 536 536 536 5896
Note. Consul p consultation only. Standard errors in parentheses.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
16. Following the recommendation of King and Zeng (2001, 702), we
collect 10 times more no alliance observations than alliance observations.
As we have 536 alliance observations, the resulting sample size is 536 1
536 # 10 p 5896. We also conducted analysis using five times more
observations, and our interpretation of results was not affected. See tables
A.22 through A.25 in the appendix.
976 / Democratic States and Alliance Design Daina Chiba, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds
This content downloaded from 128.163.002.206 on August 01, 2020 20:52:30 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
including control variables. Columns 3 and 4 present our
2PM, with column 3 showing the effects of the independent
variables on the probability an alliance that is formed in-
cludes only consultation obligations, while column 4 shows
the effects of the independent variables on the probability
an alliance is formed at all.
The results in table 1 provide support for hypothesis 1.
Alliances formed by a larger proportion of democracies are
more likely to obligate states to future consultation rather
than active assistance. This suggests that leaders that expect
to experience high costs for violating alliance agreements
may commit to obligations that provide them with dis-
cretion over the required actions in the event of conflict. In
addition, most of our control variables are also statistically
significant in the directions we would expect. States are less
likely to limit their alliance promises to consultation only
when they are involved in a war, when they face a high threat
environment, and when they share more similar interests
with their alliance partners. On the other hand, contrary to
our expectations, as the number of alliance members in-
creases, states appear to be less likely to limit their promises
to consultation. Our interpretation of results is not affected
by including nonalliance cases, either using the 2PM strategy
or a multinomial logit strategy (see table A.24 in the ap-
pendix). The results from the multinomial logit show that
k-ads with a higher proportion of democracies are more
likely to form consultation pacts rather than other types of
alliances, less likely to form other types of alliance (e.g., de-
fense pacts, offense pacts, and neutrality pacts) than to form
no alliance, and more likely to form consultation pacts than
no alliance.
Figure 2 shows the substantive effect of our primary
independent variable, proportion of democracies in an alli-
ance, on the likelihood that alliances obligate member states
only to consultation. This figure is created using the infor-
mation in column 3 of table 1 (the second stage of our 2PM
results). We calculate predicted probabilities for three dif-
ferent values of percent of democracies in an alliance: 0%,
50%, and 100%, while holding the values of the control vari-
ables at their mean value. Note that these three values of the
primary independent variable are the three most frequent
values observed in our data. We obtain uncertainty estimates
for the predictions following the procedures described byKing,
Tomz, and Wittenburg (2000). The three horizontal line seg-
ments located near the bottom part of the density plots indi-
cate whether the differences between the predicted probabil-
ities are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
When an alliance is formed by nondemocracies, the prob-
ability that it obligates members to future consultation is only
0.20 (shown in the white density plot at the left of the figure).
Whenwe increase the value of the proportion of democracy to
50% (holding everything else constant), the predicted prob-
Table 2. Logit and 2PM Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815–2003
Logit 3 Logit 4 2PM 2
Def Con
(1)
Def Con
(2)
Def Con
(3)
Defense
(4)
Proportion of democracies .72* 1.00** 1.00** 21.22***
(.40) (.48) (.47) (.25)
Similarity of interests 21.15* 21.15 1.54***
(.67) (.73) (1.50)
Number of members .11** .11* .11***
(.05) (.06) (.03)
Offense obligation 1.54*** 1.54***
(.33) (.31)
Consultation obligation 2.85*** 2.85***
(.29) (.28)
Constant 2.34** .24 .24 24.28***
(.15) (.64) (.68) (.46)
Observations 260 260 260 5896
Note. Def Con p Defense Conditionality. Standard errors in parentheses.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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ability increases to 0.35 (shown in the light gray density plot
in the middle of the figure). When all the states forming an
alliance are democracies, the predicted probability that the
alliance will commit the states only to future consultation is
0.55 (shown in the dark gray density plot at the right of the
figure). The differences between these three probability esti-
mates are highly significant.
Table 2 reports our evaluation of hypothesis 2. The de-
pendent variable for this analysis is a dichotomous variable
that codes whether the defense pact specifies limits to the
conditions under which the defensive obligation is invoked.
Again, column 1 reports results of a logit analysis of a model
specification that includes only our primary independent var-
iable, column 2 reports results of the logit analysis of a model
specification including our control variables, and columns 3
and 4 present a 2PM.
The results in table 2 provide support for hypothesis 2,
although the size of the coefficient and its level of confi-
dence both increase in the models that include the control
variables. Defense pacts formed by a larger proportion of
democracies are more likely to specify limits to the con-
ditions under which defensive obligations are invoked. This
finding is commensurate with our argument that leaders
who expect to experience high costs for violating alliance
agreements may be very specific in committing to actions
that they are likely to be willing to take. The results in table 2
also provide some support for our expectations about our
control variables. States that share more similar interests
with their alliance partners are less likely to limit the con-
ditions under which their defense pacts are invoked in the
logit and multinomial logit model (see table A.25 in the
appendix), but this variable does not reach conventional
levels of statistical significance in the 2PM. As the number
of original alliance members increases, however, the condi-
tions under which a defense pact may be invoked are more
likely to be limited. Alliances that include both defensive
and offensive obligations are more likely to include limits
to the conditions under which the defensive obligation is in-
voked. Finally, when states include consultation obligations in
their defense pacts they are less likely to include limits to the
conditions under which the defensive obligation is invoked.
Figure 3 shows the substantive effect of the proportion
of original members with democratic political systems on
the likelihood that defensive alliances have specific limits
on the conditions under which they are invoked. Once again,
we calculate predicted probabilities for three different values
of democracy proportion. These estimates are based on col-
umn 3 of table 2 while holding the values of the control
variables at their mean value. As in our earlier figure, the three
horizontal line segments located near the bottom part of the
densities indicate whether the differences between the pre-
dicted probabilities are statistically significant at the 95% con-
fidence level. The line segments show that all of the predicted
probabilities are significantly different from one another ex-
cept the predicted probability of defense pact conditionality
when the percent of democracies is 50% and when it is 100%.
Therefore, our results suggest that defense pacts formed by
all democracies are more likely to include specific conditions
than ones formed by all nondemocracies, and defense pacts
formed by 50% democracies aremore likely to include specific
Figure 2. Predicted probability that an alliance includes only consultation obligations for alliances with different proportions of democratic members
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conditions than ones formed by all nondemocracies. Both
results provide support for hypothesis 2. Given that our pre-
vious analysis shows that democracies are less likely to form
defense pacts than consultation pacts, it is not surprising that
there are a small number of defense pacts that include only
democratic members, and thus that there is substantial un-
certainty around our predictions about these cases.
The results reported in tables 1 and 2 and figures 2 and
3 provide support for additional implications of a body of
research on the effect of domestic politics on international
relations. While past research has demonstrated that regime
type affects the propensity of states to fulfill their interna-
tional agreements, we suggest that regime type also affects
the willingness of states to commit to broad and deep co-
operation. What is an advantage for democratic states in
making their commitments credible (and thus attracting part-
ners to their cooperative endeavors) may simultaneously make
democratic leaders reluctant to join international commit-
ments that require particularly broad or deep cooperation,
except when they are very confident that fulfilling the agree-
ment will be in their future interest. The tendency noted by
Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) for states to commit to
agreements that they know they can fulfill may be particu-
larly applicable to democracies.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Our work suggests that states that expect high costs from
violating commitments may design cooperative agreements
in ways that limit their future obligations; they may be more
reluctant to form “deep” agreements. When such states do
form deep agreements, however, one can deduce that they
have little uncertainty about their willingness to fulfill the
agreement if the agreement is invoked. Combined, this sug-
gests two things: (1) it may be very difficult to observe in-
stances in which a state is constrained by a past agreement,
and (2) screening effects are stronger for states that have a
high probability of constraint. It may not be appropriate to
ask whether agreements screen or constrain (see, e.g., Sim-
mons and Hopkins 2005; von Stein 2005). Agreements screen
when they have the potential to constrain, and the better they
screen, the less easy it is to observe constraint.
Consider, for instance, an ongoing debate about whether
or not democracies make more reliable alliance partners.
There appears to be consistent evidence that alliances in-
volving democratic states last longer and are less likely to be
terminated in violation of their terms (Bennett 1997; Gau-
batz 1996; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009; Leeds and Savun
2007). On the other hand, there is at least some debate about
whether democracies are more likely to assist their alliance
partners in wars and militarized disputes. Leeds (2003a) finds
that democracies are less likely to violate their commitments
in wartime, whereas Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) argue that
democracies are actually more likely to violate their alliance
commitments during wartime. A major difference between
the two research designs is that Leeds (2003a) judges reli-
ability by whether or not the alliance member joined a war in
which the specific alliance obligations were invoked. Cases in
which the alliance treaty did not specify that a partner was
required to join a conflict were dropped from the analysis
Figure 3. Predicted probability that defense obligations are conditional for alliances with different proportions of democratic members
Volume 77 Number 4 October 2015 / 979
This content downloaded from 128.163.002.206 on August 01, 2020 20:52:30 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
on the basis that they provide no information about whether
the alliance member violated the terms of the treaty. In their
main analysis, however, Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) do not
take into account the specific terms of the treaty.17 Instead,
they analyze whether each member of a defense pact joined
any war in which one of its allies was involved. Since de-
mocracies are more likely to place limits on their commit-
ments, an analysis that does not take into account such limits
is likely to come to different conclusions about democratic
reliability than one that does take into account the care states
take in crafting their treaties.
The conclusions for democratic reliability, then, may be
more nuanced than previously reported. On one hand, it
seems likely that when one takes into account the specific
promises made in a treaty, democracies may be more likely
to fulfill their commitments. At the same time, this is due
not only to the costs that democracies experience from vio-
lating their past promises but also to the propensity for de-
mocracies to make very careful commitments and avoid ob-
ligating themselves to participating in conflicts in which they
may not have an interest. The effect is likely driven both by
constraint and by selection.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Recent international relations scholarship emphasizes the
high costs that democratic leaders pay for violating past com-
mitments. This emphasis has enhanced our understanding of
crisis bargaining as well as the emergence and success of inter-
national cooperation. We build on this research by suggesting
that the high costs suffered by democratic leaders for violating
past commitments can also help us understand the design of
agreements. Democratic leaders foresee these high costs and are
careful to design agreements that limit their risks of paying them.
We evaluate this argument in the context of military alli-
ance design. If democratic leaders experience relatively high
costs for violating alliance agreements, then they should adopt
design features that reduce their chances of being unable or
unwilling to fulfill their alliance commitments. We suggest
there are two primary strategies that democratic leadersmight
choose between in designing their alliances for this purpose.
First, theymightmake flexible commitments that do not com-
mit them to specific future action. Second, they might be very
clear about the specific conditions under which the alliance
is invoked. By analyzing data on alliance treaties and regime
type from 1815 to 2003 we find support for both hypotheses.
This evidence has significant implications for understand-
ing the relationship between regime type and international
cooperation. On one hand, the domestic costs associated with
breaking international commitments makes democratic states
reliable treaty partners. On the other hand, the same domestic
costs can make democratic states wary of engaging in agree-
ments requiring broad and/or deep cooperation. Future re-
search linking domestic political institutions with interna-
tional cooperation will benefit from paying attention to both
of these effects.
In addition, this study should be of interest to scholars
studying the effects of international agreements on behavior
in all areas. For example, in the human rights issue area,
scholars have noted that on one hand, some strong propo-
nents of human rights like the United States have been re-
luctant to sign agreements that their policies comply with.
On the other hand, there appear to be a set of states willing to
sign human rights agreements and violate them egregiously.
Those states that believe the agreements are more likely to be
enforced through domestic processes are more reluctant to
sign, whereas states that are less wary of costs of noncom-
pliance sign agreementsmore readily (e.g., Simmons 2009). In
both the human rights case and in our alliance case, screening
appears to be endogenous to expectations of constraint. This
significantly complicates efforts to separate the screening and
constraining effects of agreements and suggests that the two
should be seen as complements to one another rather than
alternative paths of influence. Our research suggests that we
can isolate at least some observable factors that influence
constraining (and, in turn, screening) effects, which should
facilitate future research.
Finally, our research supports the view that screening
happens not only through the decision to form an agree-
ment or not but also through design decisions about the
scope and flexibility of agreements. While paying attention
to the design decisions that leaders make in formulating
their promises does increase the complexity of research, it
also offers an important payoff in understanding the role
international law can play. Such studies have the potential
to provide important policy recommendations about effec-
tive agreement design.
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